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ABSTRACT 
There is a brief description of the probabilistic causal 
graph model for representing, reasoning with, and learn­
ing causal structure using Bayesian networks. It is then 
argued that this model is closely related to how humans 
reason with and learn causal structure. It is shown that 
studies in psychology on discounting (reasoning concern­
ing how the presence of one cause of an effect makes an­
other cause less probable) support the hypothesis that 
humans reach the same judgments as algorithms for do­
ing inference in Bayesian networks. Next, it is shown 
how studies by Piaget indicate that humans learn causal 
structure by observing the same independencies and de­
pendencies as those used by certain algorithms for learn­
ing the structure of a Bayesian network. Based on this 
indication, a subjective definition of causality is for­
warded. Finally, methods for further testing the accu­
racy of these claims are discussed. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A new perspective on causation has emerged from re­
searchers in artificial intelligence. In efforts to create sys­
tems that can reason with causal relationship, they de­
veloped a probabilistic graphical model of causality. The 
probabilistic graphical structure for representing causal 
relationship is called a Bayesian network. The com­
bination of representing, reasoning with, and learning 
causal structure using Bayesian networks we term here 
as the Probabilistic Causal Graph (PCG) Model. 
This model has proved useful in artificial intelligence and 
expert systems applications. However, is it related to 
how humans reason with and learn causal knowledge? 
The importance of understanding human reasoning to 
artificial intelligence does need elaboration. Judea Pearl 
[1986, 1995] has long argued that humans perform infer­
ence with existing causal knowledge in the same way as 
a well-known algorithm for doing inference in a Bayesian 
network. In Section 3.1 we summarize his argument and 
cite research on human subjects that support it. Then, 
in Section 3.2 we present the main result of this paper. 
That is, we hypothesize that humans learn causal knowl­
edge by observing the same independencies and depen­
dencies used by certain algorithms for learning the struc­
ture of a Bayesian network. We support this claim with 
results of studies by Piaget [1952, 1954, 1966] on infants 
and children. Our conjecture, together with Pearl's, con­
stitute a model of how humans reason with and learn 
causes. We begin in Section 2 with a brief description of 
the probabilistic causal graphical model. 
2 THE PCG MoDEL 
The Probabilistic Causal Graph Model assumes that the 
causal relationships among a set of variables U can be 
modeled by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) D (called 
a Bayesian network) in which each node consists of an 
element of U, and a joint probability distribution P, 
on the variables in U, which satisfies the Markov and 
faithfulness conditions for D. The edges in 'D are meant 
to represent direct causal influences. Figure 1 shows a 
Bayesian network in which the variables have to do with 
the causal mechanisms underlying how pavement could 
get wet. These are probabilistic rather than determin­
istic relationships. For example, the pavement will not 
get wet even when the sprinkler is on if the pavement 
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is covered with a blanket. Notice there is no edge from 
K to L because the sprinkler does not directly cause a 
slippery pavement. Rather it is only through making it 
wet that this happens. There are only edges from direct 
causes to effects. In general, if we found out the sprin­
kler were on, it should increase the probability that the 
pavement would be slippery because it would make it 
more probable that the pavement were wet. However, 
according to this model, if we already knew the pave­
ment was wet, there would be a fixed probability it was 
slippery. Finding out the sprinkler was on would not 
increase that probability. The idea is that knowledge of 
an effect's direct causes shields the effect from the influ­
ence of variables that can affect those causes. This is the 
Markov condition, which is stated formally as follows. A 
probability distribution P on the variables in 7J satisfies 
the Markov condition for 7J if the value assumed by 
a variable X in 1J is probabilistically independent of the 
values of all other variables in 1J, except the descendents 
of X, conditional on the parents of X. 
Next we discuss the faithfulness condition. Consider 
again Figure 1. Intuitively, the sprinkler being on should 
increase the probability of it being summer, which should 
therefore decrease the probability it had rained. The 
Markov condition only requires that the sprinkler and 
rain be independent given the season; it does not require 
that they be dependent if we do not know the season. 
Here is where the faithfulness condition comes in. A 
probability distribution P on the variables in 1J satisfies 
the faithfulness condition for 1J if all the conditional 
independencies true in P are entailed by the Markov 
condition applied to D. 
The Probabilistic Causal Graph Model includes algo­
rithms for reasoning with and learning causes. The next 
section discusses ones most pertinent to our research 
plans. Summaries of other algorithms are in [Pearl, 
1988], [Neapolitan, 1990], [Spirtes et al, 1993], [Beck­
erman et al, 1994], [Glymour, 1996], and [Castillo et al, 
1997]. 
3 THE PCG MODEL AND HUMAN 
REASONING 
The Probabilistic Causal Graph Model does much to re­
fute Christensen's [1990, p.279] claim that 'causation is 
not something that can be established by data analy­
sis. Establishing causation requires logical arguments 
that go beyond the realm of numerical manipulation.' 
However, does it have anything to do with how humans 
reason with and learn causes? We discuss arguments for 
each of these next. 
SPRINKLER 
(On, Off) 
SEASON 
(Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter} 
RAIN 
(Yes, No} 
PAVEMENT WET 
(Yes, No) 
Figure 1- A Bayesian Network 
3.1 REASONING WITH CAUSES 
Pearl [1988, 1995] argues that humans structure causal 
knowledge in a Bayesian network and reason with that 
knowledge similar to a message-passing algorithm devel­
oped in (Pearl, 1986]. Pearl's argument is not that a 
globally consistent Bayesian network exists at the cog­
nitive level. 'Instead, fragmented structures of causal 
organizations are constantly being assembled on the fly, 
as needed, from a stock of functional building blocks' 
- [Pearl, 1995]. For example, suppose a Mr. Holmes 
has observed earthquakes trigger his alarm in the past. 
Having learned that his alarm had sounded at home, 
he would assemble the cause-effect edge directed from 
BURGLAR to ALARM. He would reason along this 
edge in the direction from ALARM to BURGLAR to 
conclude that he had probably been burglarized. If 
he later learned of an earthquake, he would assem­
ble the EARTHQUAKE-+ALARM directed edge. He 
would then reason that the earthquake explains away 
the alarm, and therefore he had probably not been 
burglarized. If, when Mr. Holmes got home, he saw 
strange footprints in the yard, he would assemble the 
BURGLAR-+FOOTPRINTS directed edge and reason 
along that edge. This tracing of edges is how Pearl's 
[1986] algorithm for doing inference in a Bayesian net­
work proceeds. That algorithm updates probabilities in 
sequence along the edges using Bayes' Rule. 
Recent research in psychology lends some support to 
the argument that humans reach the same judgments as 
those that would be reached by algorithms for doing in-
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ference in a Bayesian network. Psychologists have long 
been interested in how an individual judges the presence 
of a cause when informed of the presence of one of its 
effects, and whether and to what degree the individual 
becomes less confident in the cause when informed that 
another cause of the effect was present. Kelly [1972] 
called this inference discounting. Several researchers 
([Jones, 1979], [Quattrone, 1982], [Einhorn and Hoga­
rth, 1982], [McClure, 1989]) have argued that studies 
indicate that in certain situations people discount less 
than is warranted. On the other hand, arguments that 
people discount more than is warranted also have a long 
history (See, [Kanouse, 1972], and [Nisbett and Ross, 
1980]). In many of the discounting studies, individu­
als were asked to state their feelings about the presence 
of a particular cause when informed another cause was 
present. For example, a classic finding is that subjects 
who read an essay defending Fidel Castro's regime in 
Cuba ascribe a pro-Castro attitude to the essay writer 
even when informed that the writer was instructed to 
take a pro-Castro stance. Researchers interpreted these 
results as indicative of underdiscounting. Morris and 
Larrick [1995] argue that the problem in these studies 
is that the researchers assume that subjects believe a 
cause is sufficient for an effect when they do not. Mor­
ris and Larrick [1995] repeated the Castro studies, but 
used subjective probability testing instead of assuming, 
for example, that the subject believes an individual will 
always write a pro-Castro essay whenever told to do so 
(They found that subjects only felt it was highly proba­
ble this would happen). In subjective probability testing, 
the subject is given a problem that can be solved us­
ing applications of Bayes' rule, and then asked to judge 
the probability in each component of the problem along 
with the solution. A solution (called the normative so­
lution) is then obtained by applying Bayes' rule to the 
subject's subjective probabilities. F inally, that solution 
is compared to the subject's solution. When they re­
placed deterministic relationships by probabilistic ones, 
Morris and Larrick [1995] found that subjects discounted 
about normatively. This means, when reasoning with 
multiple causes, they approximately reached the same 
judgments as algorithms for doing inference in Bayesian 
networks. 
3.2 LEARNING CAUSES 
Next we present an argument that humans learn causal 
structure by observing the same independencies and de­
pendencies used by certain algorithms for learning the 
structure of a Bayesian network. Indeed, we argue that 
the very notion of causality develops from the observa­
tion of these independencies/dependencies. 
3.2.1 AN ALGORITHM FOR LEARNING CAUSAL 
STRUCTURE 
Part of our intuition concerning cause-effect relation­
ships is that an effect cannot precede one of its causes 
in time. Therefore, if we have the benefit of a time or­
dering of the variables, we can learn causal influences 
with an algorithm based on the theorem that follows. 
First we need some notation. When two variables are 
independent conditional on some subset of variables, S 
(possibly empty), we denote this by I(X, YjS). 
Theorem 1 Suppose a probability distribution P sat­
isfies the Markov and faithfulness conditions for some 
DAG D whose nodes are the elements in U. Then there 
is a directed path from X to Y in D if there is a third 
variable Z and a set of variables Sxy, such that Z and 
all of the elements in Sxy are not descendents of X, 
satisfying the following: 
1. ---.J(Z, YJSxv) 
2. I(Z, J1SxvU{X}). 
If we have a time ordering of the variables, any vari­
able preceding another in time could not be a descendent 
of that variable. Therefore, the following algorithm fol­
lows from Theorem 1. Given the assumption that the 
observed variables are a subset of variables in a DAG V 
for which P satisfies the Markov and faithfulness condi­
tions, and given as input independencies and dependen­
cies among the observed variables, the algorithm pro­
duces links which represent directed paths in V. 
Algorithm I 
order the variables according to time; 
for each pair of variables, X and Y such that X 
precedes Y do 
search for a set Sxy and a variable Z such that 
Z and all variables in Sxy precede X and 
1 . ...,J(Z, J1Sxv) 
2. I(Z, YISxvU{X}) 
end; 
If such a couple is found then 
create a link X ---t Y, which means X has a causal 
influence on Y 
end 
end; 
Similar, more detailed algorithms, which do not re­
quire a time ordering of the variables, appear in [Pearl 
and Verma, 1991], [Spirtes et al, 1993], and [Glymour, 
1996]. 
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3.2.2 WHAT IS A CAUSE? 
Rather than offering an explicit definition of causality, 
the probabilistic causal graph model assumes that the 
probability distribution satisfies certain properties (the 
Markov and faithfulness conditions) we intuitively feel 
hold for causal relationships. Implicitly, a cause is then 
defined to be any directed link learned by algorithms 
like the preceding one. To discover a cause, the algo­
rithm must be given a set of variables. But how do we 
know what these variables are? Consider the following 
example taken from [Spirtes et al, 1993, p. 42]. 
If C is the event of striking a match, and A 
is the event of the match catching on fire, and 
no other events are considered, then C is a di­
rect cause of A. If, however, we added B; the 
sulfur on the matchtip achieved sufficient heat 
to combine with the oxygen, then we could no 
longer say that C directly caused A, but rather 
C directly caused B and B directly caused A. 
Accordingly, we say that B is a causal mediary 
between C and A if C causes B and B causes 
A. 
Clearly, we can add more causal mediaries. For ex­
ample, we could add the event D that the match tip 
is abraded by a rough surface. C would then cause D, 
which would cause B, etc. We could go much further and 
describe the chemical reaction that occurs when sulfur 
combines with oxygen. Indeed, it seems we can con­
ceive of a continuum of events in any causal description 
of a process. We see then that the set of observable 
variables is observer dependent. Apparently, an individ­
ual, given a myriad of sensory input, selectively records 
discernible events and develops cause-effect relationships 
among them. Therefore, for the purpose of modeling 
human thought, rather than assuming there is a set of 
causally related variables out there, it seems more appro­
priate to only assume that each individual develops a set 
of 'causal' relationships among variables, which are spe­
cific to the individual (although many are shared), and 
the individual reconstructs these relationships on-the-fly 
when reasoning. 
What is this relationship among variables that the 
notion of causality embodies? It seems reasonable to 
assume that most human knowledge derives from sta­
tistical observations, and that therefore a causal rela­
tionship must recapitulate some statistical observation 
among variables. Should we look at the adult to learn 
what this statistical observation might be? As Piaget 
and lnhelder [1969, p. 157] note, 'Adult thought might 
seem to provide a preestablished model, but the child 
does not understand adult thought until he has recon­
structed it, and thought is itself the result of an evo-
lution carried on by several generations, each of which 
has gone through childhood.' The intellectual concept 
of causality has been developed through many genera­
tions and knowledge of many (if not most) cause-effect 
relationship are passed on to individuals by previous gen­
erations. Piaget and Inhelder [1969, p. ix] note further 
'While the adult educates the child by means of multiple 
social transmissions, every adult, even if he is a creative 
genius, begins as a small child.' So we will look to the 
small child, indeed to the infant, for the genesis of the 
concept of causality. We will discuss results of studies by 
Piaget. We will show how these results can lead us to a 
definition of causality as a statistical relationship among 
an individual's observed variables. 
3.2.3 THE GENESIS OF THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY 
Piaget [1952, 1954, 1966] established a theory of the de­
velopment of sensori-motor intelligence in infants from 
birth until about age two. He distinguished six stages 
within the sensori-motor period. Our purpose here is 
not to recount these stages, but rather to discuss some 
observations Piaget made in several stages, which might 
shed light on what observed relationships the concept of 
causality recapitulates. 
Piaget argues that the mechanism of learning 'consists 
in assimilation; meaning that reality data are treated or 
modified in such a way as to become incorporated into 
the structure ... According to this view, the organizing ac­
tivity of the subject must be considered just as important 
as the connections inherent in the external stimuli.'- [Pi­
aget and lnhelder, 1969, p. 5]. We will investigate how 
the infant organizes external stimuli into cause-effect re­
lationships. 
The third sensori-motor stage goes from about the age 
of four months to nine months. Here is a description of 
what Piaget observed in infants in this stage (taken from 
[Drescher, 1991, p. 27]): 
Secondary circular reactions are characteris­
tic of third stage behavior; these consist of 
the repetition of actions in order to reproduce 
fortuitously-discovered effects on objects. For 
example: 
• The infant's hand hits a hanging toy. The infant 
sees it bob about, then repeats the gesture several 
times, later applying it to other objects as well, de­
veloping a striking schema for striking. 
• The infant pulls a string hanging from the bassinet 
hood and notices a toy, also connected to the hood, 
shakes in response. The infant again grasps and 
pulls the string, already watching the toy rather 
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than the string. Again, the spatial and causal na­
ture of the connection between the objects is not 
well understood; the infant will generalize the ges­
ture to inappropriate situations. 
Piaget and Inhelder [1969, p. 10] discuss these inap-
propriate situations: 
Later you need only hang a new toy from the 
top of the cradle for the child to look for the 
cord, which constitutes the beginning of a dif­
ferentiation between means and end. In the 
days that follow, when you swing an object 
from a pole two yards from the crib, and even 
when you produce unexpected and mechanical 
sounds behind a screen, after these sights or 
sounds have ceased the child will look for and 
pull the magic cord. Although the child's ac­
tions seem to reflect a sort of magical belief in 
causality without any material connection, his 
use of the same means to try to achieve differ­
ent ends indicates that he is on the threshold 
of intelligence. 
Piaget and Inhelder [1969, p. 18] note that 'this early 
notion of causality may be called magical phenomenalist; 
"phenomenalist"; because the phenomenal contiguity of 
two events is sufficient to make them appear causally 
related.' At this point, the notion of causality in the 
infant's model entails a primitive cause--effect relation­
ship between actions and results. For example if Z ='pull 
string hanging from bassinet hood' and Y ='toy shakes', 
the infant's model contains the causal relationship Z � Y. 
The infant extends this relationship to believe there may 
be an arrow from Z to other desired results even when 
they were not preceded by Z. Drescher [1991, p. 28] 
states that the 'causal nature of the connection between 
the objects is not well understood.' Since our goal here 
is to determine what relationships the concept of causal­
ity recapitulates, we do not want to assume there is a 
'causal nature of the connection' that is actually out 
there. Rather we could say that at this stage an infant is 
only capable of forming two-variable relationships. The 
infant cannot see how a third variable may enter into the 
relationship between any two. :For example, the infant 
cannot develop the notion that the hand is moving the 
bassinet hood, which in turn makes the toy shake. 
Although there are advances in the fourth stage {about 
age nine months to one year), the infant's model still only 
includes two variables relationships during this stage. It 
is in the fifth stage (commencing at about one year of 
age) that the infant sees a bigger picture. Here is an 
account by [Drescher, 1991, p. 34] of what can happen 
in this stage: 
You may recall that some secondary circular 
reactions involved influencing one object by 
pulling another connected to the first by a 
string. But that effect was discovered entirely 
by accident, and, with no appreciation of the 
physical connection. During the present stage, 
the infant wishing to influence a remote object 
learns to search for an attached string, visual1y 
tracing the path of connection. 
Piaget and Inhelder [1969, p. 19] describe this fifth 
stage behavior as follows: 
In the behavior patterns of the support, the 
string , and the stick, for example, it is clear 
that the movements of the rug, the string, or 
the stick are believed to influence those of the 
subject (independently of the author of the dis­
placement). 
If we let Z ='pull string hanging from bassinet hood', 
X='bassinet hood moves', and Y='toy shakes', at this 
stage the infant develops the relationship that Z is con­
nected to Y through X. At this point, the infant's model 
entails that Z and Y are dependent, but that X is 
a causal mediary and that they are independent given 
X. Using our previous notation, this relationship is ex­
pressed as follows: 
-,J(Z, Y) I(Z, YIX) ( 1) 
The fifth stage infant shows no signs of mentally simu­
lating the relationship between objects and learning from 
the simulation instead of from actual experimentation. 
So it can only form causal relationships by repeated ex­
periments. Furthermore, although it seems to recognize 
the conditional independence, it does not seem to rec­
ognize a causal relationship between X and Y that is 
merely learned via Z. Because it only learns from actual 
experiments, the third variable is always part of the re­
lationship. This changes in the sixth stage. Piaget and 
Inhelder [1969, p. 11] describe this stage as follows: 
Finally, a sixth stage marks the end of the 
sensori-motor period and the transition to the 
following period. In this stage the child be­
comes capable of finding new means not only be 
external or physical groping but also by inter­
nalized combinations that culminate in sudden 
comprehension or insight. 
Drescher [1991, p. 35] gives the following example of 
what can happen at this stage: 
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An infant who reaches the sixth stage without 
happening to have learned about (say) using a 
stick may invent that behavior (in response to 
a problem that requires it) quite suddenly. 
It is in the sixth stage that the infant recognizes an 
object will move as long as something hits it (e.g. the 
stick); that there need by no specific learned sequence 
of events. Therefore, at this point the infant recognizes 
the movement of the bassinet hood as a cause of the toy 
shaking, and that the toy will shake if the hood is moved 
by any means whatsoever. 
The argument here is not that the two-year-old child 
has causal notions like those of the adult. Rather that 
they are as described by Piaget and lnhelder [1969, p. 
13]: 
It organizes reality by constructing the broad 
categories of action which are the schemes of 
the permanent object, space, time, and causal­
ity, substructures of the notions that will later 
correspond to them. None of these categories is 
given at the outset, and the child's initial uni­
verse is entirely centered on his own body and 
action in an egocentrism as total as it is un­
conscious (for lack of consciousness of the self). 
In the course of the first eighteen months, how­
ever, there occurs a kind of Copernican revo­
lution, or, more simply, a kind of general de­
centering process whereby the child eventually 
comes to regard himself as an object among 
others in a universe that is made up of per­
manent objects and in which there is at work 
a causality that is both localized in space and 
objectified in things. 
Piaget and Inhelder [1969, p. 90] feel that these early 
notions are the foundations of the concepts developed 
later in life: 
The roots of logic are to be sought in the 
general coordination of actions (including ver­
bal behavior) beginning with the sensori-motor 
level, whose schemes are of fundamental impor­
tance . This schematism continues thereafter to 
develop and to structure thought, even verbal 
thought, in terms of the progress of actions, 
until the formation of the logico-mathematical 
operations. 
Piaget found that the development of the intellectual 
notion of causality mirrors the development of the in­
fant's notion. This is discussed in Piaget and Inhelder 
[1969, p. 110]: 
The stars "were born when we were born," 
says the boy of six, "because before that there 
was no need for sunlight." .. . Interestingly 
enough, this precausality is close to the ini­
tial sensori-motor forms of causality, which we 
called "magical-phenomenalist" in Chapter 1. 
Like those, it results from a systematic assim­
ilation of physical processes to the child's own 
action, an assimilation which sometimes leads 
to quasi-magical attitudes (for instance, many 
subjects between four and six believe that the 
moon follows them .... ) But, just as sensori­
motor precausality makes way {after Stages 4 to 
6 of infancy) for an objectified and spacialized 
causality, so representative precausality, which 
is essentially an assimilation to actions, is grad­
ually, at the level of concrete operations , trans­
formed into a rational causality by assimilation 
no longer to the child's own action in their eg(}­
centric orientation but to the operations as gen­
eral coordination of actions. 
In the period of concrete operations (between the ages 
of seven and eleven), the child develops the adult con­
cept of causality. According to Piaget, that concept has 
its foundations in the notion of objective causality de­
veloped at the end of the sensori-motor period. 
In summary, we have offered the hypothesis that the 
concept of causality develops in the individual, starting 
in infancy, through the observation of statistical rela­
tionships among variables and we have given supportive 
evidence for that hypothesis. But what of the properties 
of actual causal relationships that a statistical explana­
tion may not seem to address? For example, consider 
the child who moves the toy by pulling the rug on which 
it is situated. We said that the child develops the causal 
relationship that the moving rug causes the toy to move. 
An adult, in particularly a physicist, would have a far 
more detailed explanation. For example, the explanation 
might say that the toy is sufficiently massive to cause a 
downward force on the rug so that the rug does not slide 
from underneath the toy, etc. However, such an expla­
nation is not unlike that of the child's; it simply contains 
more variables based on the adult's keener observations 
and having already developed the intellectual concept of 
causality. Piaget and Inhelder [1969, p. 19] note that 
even the stage five infant requires physical contact be­
tween the toy and rug to infer causality: 
If the object is placed beside the rug and not 
on it, the child at Stage 5 will not pull the sup­
porting object ,  whereas the child at Stage 3 or 
even 4 who has been trained to make use of the 
supporting object will still pull the rug even if 
390 Morris, Cork, and Neapolitan 
the object no longer maintains with it the spa­
tial relationship "placed upon." 
This physical contact is a necessary component to the 
child forming the causal link, but it is not the mecha­
nism by which the link develops. The hypothesis here is 
that this mechanism is the observed statistical relation­
ships among the variables. Concern over actual causal 
relationships is not pertinent in a psychological investi­
gation into the genesis of the concept of causality because 
that concept is part of the human model; not part of re­
ality itself. As Kant [1787] noted long ago, we cannot 
truly gain access to what is 'out there'. What is perti­
nent is how humans assimilate reality into the concept 
of causality. We are hypothesizing that this concept de­
veloped to describe the observed statistical relationship 
among variables shown in this section. 
3.2.4 A DEFINITION OF CAUSALITY 
Considerations of the Markov and faithfulness conditions 
led Pearl and Verma {1991] to the following definition of 
causality. 
Definition 2 A variable X has a causal influence on a 
variable Y if there is a third variable Z and a context 
Sxy, both occurring before X such that: 
1. -.I(Z, J-1Sxy) 
2. I(Z, J-1 SxyU{X}) 
By a context Sxy, they mean any set (including the 
empty set) of instantiated variables. Note that this def­
inition is exactly the conditions used in Algorithm I to 
deduce directed paths in a Bayesian network. 
Given that the infant is always in some context, our 
expression (Expression 1), which summarizes the in­
fant's perceived relationships among variables, is identi­
cal to Pearl's definition. We conjecture that the intuition 
for the Markov and faithfulness conditions also develop 
when the infant is first capable of modeling with three 
variables, and we instead offer Definition 2 as a defini­
tion of causality based on our argument that the concept 
developed as a recapitulation of the statistical relation­
ships in this definition. Since the variables are specific 
to an individual's observations, this is a subjective def­
inition of causality not unlike the subjective definition 
of probability. Indeed, since it is based on statistical 
relationships, one could say it is in terms of that defi­
nition. According to this view, there are no objective 
causes as such. Bertrand Russell [1913] long ago noted 
that causation played no role in physics and wanted to 
eliminate the word from science. Similarly, Karl Pear­
son [1911] wanted it removed from statistics. W hether 
this would be appropriate for these disciplines is another 
issue. However, the concept is important in psychology 
and artificial intelligence because humans model the ex­
terior in terms of causation. We have suggested that the 
genesis of the concept lies in the statistical relationship 
shown above. lf this so, for the purposes of these disci­
plines, the statistical definition would be accurate. This 
definition simplifies the task of the researcher in artifi­
cial intelligence as we need not engage in metaphysical 
wrangling about causality. 
4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
A considerable reason for understanding how humans 
reason with and learn causes is that this understanding 
may give us clues as how to create a lifelike learning 
and reasoning system. Current algorithms for learning 
causal structure require the set of variables and proba­
bility distribution as input; they then produce the links. 
However, this does not appear to be the way humans 
learn. Furthermore, such a method could not be used by 
an autonomous agent that must learn, react, and make 
decisions in a complex, dynamic environment. As noted 
by Pearl, 'human beings seem to learn in bursts, but 
how can we create artificial systems that learn this way?' 
- [private correspondence, 1995]. Stewart and Peregov 
[1983] have already used catastrophe theory to model 
sudden belief changes. By studying human subjects, we 
can gain further insight into sudden learning. We plan 
to test the accuracy of the hypotheses forwarded in this 
paper and to learn more about how humans learn causes. 
Next we briefly describe our plans. 
As discussed in Section 3.1, studies by Morris and Lar­
rick (1995] substantiate that humans reach normative 
judgments when reasoning with common causes. We 
plan to do more subjective probability testing to see 
if humans reach normative judgments when reasoning 
with indirect causes and with multiple effects. Subjec­
tive probability testing only examines the results of rea­
soning, not the process. That is , even jf humans reach 
normative judgments, it does not mean they reach them 
by traversing links as suggested by Pearl. We will use 
prime-probe concept pairing reaction time studies to test 
the cognitive representation of cause-effect relationships 
and whether humans reason by traversing links. 
As to investigating how causes are learned, previous 
studies ( [Heider, 1944], [Kelly, 1967]) indicate that hu­
mans learn causes to satisfy a need for prediction and 
control of their environment. Putting people into an ar­
tificial environment, with a large number of cues, and 
forcing them to predict and control the environment 
should produce the same types of causal reasoning that 
occurs naturally. One option is some sort of computer 
game. Occasionally, the game would be interrupted, and 
subjects would be asked to perform reaction time tasks. 
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The goal would be to see how and when subjects learned 
new causal relationship, in particular to see how subjects 
learn in bursts. 
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